UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

4-21-2016

State v. Harrison Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt.
43299

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"State v. Harrison Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 43299" (2016). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 5792.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/5792

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
NO. 43299
)
v.
)
KOOTENAI COUNTY NO. CR 2014)
20195
MICHAEL SEAN HARRISON, )
)
REPLY BRIEF
Defendant-Appellant.
)
______________________________)
________________________

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
________________________

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
________________________
HONORABLE LANSING L HAYNES
District Judge
________________________
SARA B. THOMAS
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
I.S.B. #5867
MAYA P. WALDRON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #9582
P.O. Box 2816
Boise, ID 83701
(208) 334-2712

ATTORNEYS FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534

ATTORNEY FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................................. ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE............................................................................................1
Nature of the Case ....................................................................................................1
Statement of Facts and
Course of Proceedings .............................................................................................1
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL ....................................................................................2
ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................................3
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Harrison’s
Motion To Suppress .......................................................................................................3
A. The State Failed To Prove That Mr. Harrison Consented
To The Frisk .............................................................................................................4
B. The State Failed To Prove That Any Purported Consent
Was Voluntary .........................................................................................................6
C. The State’s Suggestion That This Court Apply The District Court’s
Findings Regarding Mr. Harrison’s Consent To Empty His Pockets
To Mr. Harrison’s Alleged Consent To The Frisk Is Meritless ...............................8
CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................9
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING..........................................................................................10

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Bumper v. N. Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968) ................................................................................. 6
Liberal v. Estrada, 632 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 2011) ......................................................................... 7
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) ............................................................... 4, 5, 6, 7
State v. Garcia, 143 Idaho 774 (Ct. App. 2006) ............................................................................. 4
State v. Jaborra, 143 Idaho 94 (Ct. App. 2006) ............................................................................. 6
State v. Kerley, 134 Idaho 870 (Ct. App. 2000).......................................................................... 1, 3
State v. Knapp, 120 Idaho 343 (Ct. App. 1991).............................................................................. 4
State v. Koivu, 152 Idaho 511 (2012) ............................................................................................. 4
State v. Staatz, 132 Idaho 693 (Ct. App. 1999)............................................................................... 4
State v. Zavala, 134 Idaho 532 (Ct. App. 2000) ............................................................................. 6
United States v. Canipe, 569 F.3d 597 (6th Cir. 2009) ................................................................... 4
United States v. Lyons, 510 F.3d 1225 (10th Cir. 2007) ................................................................. 4
United States v. Shaibu, 920 F.2d 1423 (9th Cir. 1990) ............................................................. 4, 5
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) ........................................................................... 4

ii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
In his appellant’s brief, Michael Sean Harrison argued that the district court erred by
denying his motion to suppress because Officer Harrison unlawfully detained and then frisked
him, Mr. Harrison’s consent to empty his pockets was invalid because it was inextricably bound
to the unlawful detention and frisk, and Mr. Harrison’s consent to empty his pockets was not
voluntary. In response, the State asserts that Officer Harrison had reasonable suspicion to detain
Mr. Harrison, it is irrelevant whether the frisk was irrevocably intertwined with Mr. Harrison’s
consent to empty his pockets because he consented to the initial frisk, and Mr. Harrison
voluntarily consented to Officer Harrison’s request to empty his pockets.
This reply brief addresses the State’s second argument.

The State acknowledges that

State v. Kerley, 134 Idaho 870 (Ct. App. 2000), controls, and does not dispute that Officer
Harrison had no reason to believe Mr. Harrison was armed and presently dangerous. (Resp.
Br., p.15.) Yet the State claims suppression is not required because Officer Harrison asked
Mr. Harrison if he could check him for weapons, and Mr. Harrison consented. (Id.) The State’s
argument is legally flawed and factually baseless. The State has not and cannot meet its burden
of proving that Mr. Harrison voluntarily consented to the frisk, and so Mr. Harrison’s later
consent to empty his pockets was invalid. Regardless of this Court’s decision on Mr. Harrison’s
other grounds for relief, this issue requires reversal. The Court should suppress the evidence,
and the fruits of the evidence, seized as a result of the unlawful frisk and search.

1

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Harrison’s motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Harrison’s Motion To Suppress
In his appellant’s brief, Mr. Harrison argued that the district court erroneously concluded
that it did not need to decide whether the pat search was justified because, according to State v.
Kerley, 134 Idaho 870, 874–75 (Ct. App. 2000), consent which is irrevocably intertwined with
an unlawful frisk cannot “purge the taint of the unlawful frisk.” (See App. Br., pp.11–12.)
Further, the frisk was unlawful because Officer Harrison did not believe that Mr. Harrison was
armed and presently dangerous. (App. Br., pp.10–13.) Therefore, the district court should have
suppressed the evidence seized as a result.
In response, the State acknowledges that Kerley controls and thus asserts that “whether
the evidence discovered as a result of that search is ‘tainted’ depends on whether the frisk itself
was lawful.” (Resp. Br., p.15.) It goes on to argue that, even assuming Officer Harrison had no
reason to believe Mr. Harrison was armed and presently dangerous,1 suppression is not required
because “Officer Harrison asked Harrison if he could check him for weapons” and Mr. Harrison
consented. (Resp. Br., p.16 (emphasis added).) The State also asserts that the district court did
not make any findings on that issue, but suggests that this Court apply the district court’s
findings regarding Mr. Harrison’s consent to empty his pockets to the State’s claim that
Mr. Harrison consented to the frisk, arguing the “situation surrounding both are similar if not the
same.” (Resp. Br., p.16 n.2.)
The State’s arguments are legally flawed and factually baseless. Because the State has
not and cannot meet its burden of proving that Mr. Harrison voluntarily consented to the frisk,

1

By failing to argue to the contrary, the State has conceded this issue.
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the Court should suppress the evidence seized as a result. See Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963); State v. Koivu, 152 Idaho 511, 519 (2012).
A.

The State Failed To Prove That Mr. Harrison Consented To The Frisk
Consent to search may be in the form of words, gestures, or conduct, State v. Staatz,

132 Idaho 693, 695 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing State v. Knapp, 120 Idaho 343, 348 (Ct. App. 1991)),
but must be “unequivocal and specific,” United States v. Shaibu, 920 F.2d 1423, 1426 (9th Cir.
1990) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Canipe, 569 F.3d 597,
602 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Lyons, 510 F.3d 1225, 1239 (10th Cir. 2007). The State has
the burden of proving that the defendant gave consent. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218, 222 (1973); State v. Garcia, 143 Idaho 774, 778 (Ct. App. 2006).
The State has not and cannot meet its burden of proving that Mr. Harrison clearly and
unequivocally consented to the frisk. First, the State’s characterization of the exchange between
Officer Harrison and Mr. Harrison is both self-serving and incorrect. The State claims that
“Officer Harrison asked Harrison if he could check him for weapons,” and then Mr. Harrison
consented. (See Resp. Br., p.16 (emphasis added).) To the contrary, Officer Harrison did not
“ask” Mr. Harrison anything—he simply told Mr. Harrison what he was going to do. (See Ex. 1,
5:16:50–5:16:55.) This is especially clear in-context:
Officer Harrison:
Mr. Harrison:
Officer Harrison:
Mr. Harrison:
Officer Harrison:
Mr. Harrison:
Officer Harrison:

Excuse me, sir? Step right over here for me. Set your stuff
down for me right there.
What’s going on?
Somebody called you in, you and your girlfriend or
whoever is in the car as a shoplifter. Set your stuff down
for me.
I didn’t ta—I didn’t—I didn’t—I didn’t steal nothing, man.
Set your stuff down. K. Step right over here for me. K.
Turn around for me.
[Unintelligible]
Pat you down make sure you don’t have any weapons, ok?
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Mr. Harrison:
Officer Harrison:
Mr. Harrison:
(Ex. 1, 5:16:35–5:17:00.)

Alright, [unintelligible]. 2
Spread your feet out for me.
Yeah.
As the video makes clear, Officer Harrison first instructed

Mr. Harrison to step over to him and turn around, then gave the explanation for why—he was
going to pat Mr. Harrison down. (See Ex. 1, 5:16:30–5:16:55.) If Officer Harrison were going
to ask Mr. Harrison if he could frisk him, it would seem rather odd to begin by directing
Mr. Harrison to face the other way; one generally asks a question face-to-face, while one
conducts a frisk from behind. By saying “ok” at the end of the statement, Officer Harrison did
not convert the entire phrase into a question—he simply asked for acknowledgement. (See Ex. 1,
5:16:50–5:16:52.)

Mr. Harrison did just that by saying “alright” to Officer Harrison’s

directives—he acknowledged what Officer Harrison had said and communicated that he was not
going to fight the frisk. (See Ex. 1, 5:16:50–5:16:55.)
What’s more, the State has overlooked Officer Harrison’s own testimony on this issue.
Officer Harrison did not testify that he asked for and was given Mr. Harrison’s consent.
(See 1/26/15 Tr., p.13, L.24 – p.15, L.15 (direct examination), p.30, L.1 – p.31, L.17 (cross
examination).) Instead, he testified that he frisked Mr. Harrison because he had general concerns
about his safety. (1/26/15 Tr., p.14, Ls.6–10 (“At that point in time I was still there alone. I

2

Counsel has attempted to transcribe this portion of the audio as accurately as possible, but it is
at times difficult to understand what Mr. Harrison said. For example, Mr. Harrison said
something after “alright.” (See Ex. 1, 5:16:50–5:16:55.) The State believes he said “Alright.
Fine.” (See Resp. Br., p.16.) Counsel does not believe Mr. Harrison said “fine,” but is unable to
make out exactly what he said. It sounds as though he said “alright, mine,” which does not make
sense in context. Even if he said “alright, fine,” that phrase only acknowledged what Officer
Harrison had said and communicated that Mr. Harrison was not going to fight the frisk. But if
the Court agrees it is unclear what Mr. Harrison said, that ambiguity cuts against the State
because it is the State’s burden to prove Mr. Harrison clearly and unequivocally consented to the
frisk. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 222; Shaibu, 920 F.2d at 1426.
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couldn’t tell what the female was doing. I couldn’t see, you know, at all what she was doing in
the vehicle and I had limited information. And my cover officer wasn’t on scene with me yet.”),
p.15, Ls.10–15 (Officer Harrison explaining that he pat searched Mr. Harrison because he “was
wearing a hooded sweatshirt, which fit loosely. It was hard to see what was in the center pouch
of the sweatshirt or along his waistline” and “[t]here were several things bulging. I couldn’t
make out what they were.”).) This is presumably why the prosecutor abandoned her claim that
Mr. Harrison consented to the frisk. (Compare R., p.71 (the State’s objection to Mr. Harrison’s
motion to suppress, stating: “The Defendant consented to a pat down search for weapons.”),
with 1/26/15 Tr., p.38, L.23 – p.39, L.19 (the prosecutor arguing only that the frisk was justified
because Officer Harrison “was unsure really what was going on” and “in regards to safety
concerns it was certainly appropriate to ask him to come toward him and to conduct that patdown search.”).) In short, Mr. Harrison did not consent to the frisk, let alone clearly and
unequivocally consent. The State has not and cannot meet its burden of proving as much.
B.

The State Failed To Prove That Any Purported Consent Was Voluntary
“Where there is coercion there cannot be consent.” Bumper v. N. Carolina, 391 U.S. 543,

550 (1968). “For no matter how subtly the coercion was applied, the resulting ‘consent’ would
be no more than a mere pretext for the unjustified police intrusion against which the Fourth
Amendment is directed.” Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 228. Mere acquiescence does not constitute
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary consent. Bumper, 391 U.S. at 548–49; State v. Jaborra,
143 Idaho 94, 98 (Ct. App. 2006). “The state has a heavy burden to prove that consent was
given freely and voluntarily.” State v. Zavala, 134 Idaho 532, 536 (Ct. App. 2000).
Whether consent was the product of coercion is a factual determination. Schneckloth,
412 U.S. at 229. The court must assess “the totality of all the surrounding circumstances—both
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the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.” Id. at 226; see also
Garcia, 143 Idaho at 778. Relevant factors include, but are not limited to, whether the defendant
knew he could deny consent; the location, conditions, and time at which the consent was given;
whether the defendant was free to leave; the number of officers involved; and the lack of any
advice to the defendant regarding his constitutional rights. Garcia, 143 Idaho at 778; see also
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226 (considering “(1) whether Miranda warnings were given; (2) the
youth of the accused; (3) the accused’s level of education or low intelligence; (4) the length of
the detention; (5) the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning; and (6) deprivation of
food or sleep.”). “Because each factual situation surrounding consent to a search is unique, [the
Court] may also take into account any other factors that [it] deem[s] relevant.” Liberal v.
Estrada, 632 F.3d 1064, 1082 (9th Cir. 2011).
Even if this Court concludes that Mr. Harrison consented, the State has not shown that his
consent was voluntary. The circumstances of the interaction were such that a reasonable person
would not feel free to refuse consent. As the dash camera video shows, Mr. Harrison said
“alright” only after Officer Harrison said “excuse me, sir, step right over here for me,” ordered
him three times to “set your stuff down for me,” then said “step right over here for me,” “turn
around for me” and “pat you down make sure you don’t have any weapons, ok?”3 (Ex. 1,
5:16:32–5:16:52; see also 1/26/15 Tr., p.30, Ls.1–19.)

A reasonable person in those

circumstances would not have felt free to refuse consent. Officer Harrison had been ordering
Mr. Harrison around, Mr. Harrison was not free to leave, and Officer Harrison did not inform

3

In the appellant’s brief, counsel transcribed this phrase as “I’m going to make sure you don’t
have any weapons.” (App. Br., p.16.) On further review, it sounds more like Officer Harrison
said “pat you down make sure you don’t have any weapons.” (See Ex. 1, 5:16:50–5:16:55.) It is
difficult to hear whether Officer Harrison said “I’m going to” at the beginning of that phrase
because Mr. Harrison is also talking at that time.
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Mr. Harrison that he could refuse to consent.

Therefore, even if this Court finds Mr. Harrison

consented, that consent was not voluntary.
C.

The State’s Suggestion That This Court Apply The District Court’s Findings Regarding
Mr. Harrison’s Consent To Empty His Pockets To Mr. Harrison’s Alleged Consent To
The Frisk Is Meritless
The State’s suggestion that “[t]he district court’s factual findings and legal conclusions

regarding Harrison’s consent to search his pockets could also be applied to Harrison’s consent to
the initial pat search because the factual situation surrounding both are similar if not the same”
is meritless. (Resp. Br., p.16 n.2.) First, the State has overlooked the district court’s findings on
this issue. Specifically, the court found: “Officer Harrison indicated clearly that he was going to
make sure that Mr. Harrison had no weapons on him and engaged in a pat search.” (1/26/15
Tr., p.49, Ls.19–21.)

Although the court did not explicitly find that Mr. Harrison did not

consent, its finding that Officer Harrison “indicated clearly” that he was going to search
Mr. Harrison, and then did so, implies as much. Second, the “factual situation” is not similar,
much less “the same.”

(Resp. Br., p.16 n.2.) Officer Harrison told Mr. Harrison that he was

going to frisk him, but asked Mr. Harrison for consent to empty his pockets. (Compare Ex. 1,
5:16:50–5:16:55 (“Pat you down make sure you don’t have any weapons, ok.”), with Ex. 1,
5:17:55–5:18:10 (“What’s in your pocket here? . . . You mind if I check?”).) The State cannot
meet its burden of proving that Mr. Harrison voluntarily consented to the frisk by pointing to the
court’s finding on a wholly separate issue.
In sum, the State has not and cannot meet its burden of proving that Mr. Harrison
voluntarily consented to the frisk. Because the State acknowledges that Kerley controls, and
does not dispute that Officer Harrison had no reason to believe Mr. Harrison was armed and
presently dangerous, the frisk was unlawful. Mr. Harrison’s later consent to empty his pockets
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was therefore invalid. The Court should suppress the evidence seized as a result of the unlawful
frisk and search, as well as the fruits of the evidence.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Harrison respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction, reverse the order
denying his motion to suppress, and remand to the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 21st day of April, 2016.

__________/s/_______________
MAYA P. WALDRON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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